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Abstract. In this paper, we introduce a novel inference attack that
we coin as the reconstruction attack whose objective is to reconstruct
a probabilistic version of the original dataset on which a classifier was
learnt from the description of this classifier and possibly some auxiliary
information. In a nutshell, the reconstruction attack exploits the struc-
ture of the classifier in order to derive a probabilistic version of dataset
on which this model has been trained. Moreover, we propose a general
framework that can be used to assess the success of a reconstruction at-
tack in terms of a novel distance between the reconstructed and original
datasets. In case of multiple releases of classifiers, we also give a strategy
that can be used to merge the different reconstructed datasets into a
single coherent one that is closer to the original dataset than any of the
simple reconstructed datasets. Finally, we give an instantiation of this
reconstruction attack on a decision tree classifier that was learnt using
the algorithm C4.5 and evaluate experimentally its efficiency. The results
of this experimentation demonstrate that the proposed attack is able to
reconstruct a significant part of the original dataset, thus highlighting
the need to develop new learning algorithms whose output is specifically
tailored to mitigate the success of this type of attack.
Keywords: Privacy, Data Mining, Inference Attacks, Decision Trees.
1 Introduction
Data mining and Privacy may seem a priori to have two antagonist goals: Data
Mining is interested in discovering knowledge hidden within the data whereas
Privacy seeks to preserve the confidentiality of personal information. The main
challenge is to find how to extract useful knowledge while at the same time
preserving the privacy of sensitive information. Privacy-Preserving Data Mining
(PPDM) [14, 1, 3] addresses this challenge through the design of data mining
algorithms providing privacy guarantees while still ensuring a good level of utility
on the output of the learning algorithm.
In this work, we take a first step in this direction by introducing an inference
attack that we coined as the reconstruction attack. The main objective of this
attack is to reconstruct a probabilistic version of the original dataset on which
a classifier was learnt from the description of this classifier and possibly some
auxiliary information. We propose a general framework that can be used to as-
sess the success of a reconstruction attack in terms of a novel distance between
the reconstructed and original datasets. In case of multiple releases of classifiers,
we also give a strategy that can be used to merge the different reconstructed
datasets into a single one that is closer to the original dataset than any of the
simple reconstructed datasets. Finally, we give an instantiation of this recon-
struction attack on a decision tree classifier that was learnt using the algorithm
C4.5 and evaluate experimentally its efficiency. The results of this experimen-
tation demonstrate that the proposed attack is able to reconstruct a significant
part of the original dataset, thus highlighting the need to develop new learning
algorithms whose output is specifically tailored to mitigate the success of this
type of attack.
The outline of the paper is as follows. First, in Section 2, we describe the
notion decision tree that is necessary to understand our paper and we review
related work on inference attacks. In Section 3, we introduce the concept of
reconstruction attack together with the framework necessary to analyze and
reason on the success of this attack. Afterwards, in Section 4, we describe an
instantiation of a reconstruction attack on decision tree classifier and evaluate
its efficiency on a real dataset. Finally, we conclude in Section 5 by proposing
new avenues of research extending the current work.
2 Background and Related Work
Decision tree. Decision tree is a predictive method widely used in data mining
for classification tasks, which describes a dataset in the form of a top-down
taxonomy [4]. Usually, the input given to a decision tree induction algorithm is
a dataset D composed of n data points, each described by a set of d attributes
A = {A1, A2, A3, . . . , Ad}. One of these attributes is a special attribute Ac,
called the class attribute. The output of the induction algorithm is a rooted
tree in which each node is a test on one (or several) attribute(s) partitioning
the dataset into two disjoint subsets (i.e., depending on the result of the test,
the walk through the tree continues either by following the right or the left
branch if the tree is binary). Moreover in a rooted tree, the root is a node
without parent and leaves are nodes without children. The decision tree model
outputted by the induction algorithm can be used as a classifier C for the class
attribute Ac that can predict the class attribute of a new data point x? given
the description of its non-class attributes. The construction of a decision tree is
usually done in a top-down manner by first setting the root to be a test on the
attribute that is the most discriminative according to some splitting criterion
that varies across different tree induction algorithms. The path from the root
to a leaf is unique and it characterizes a group of individuals at the same time
by the class at the leaf but also by the path followed. In his seminal work, Ross
Quinlan has introduced in 1986 an induction tree algorithm called ID3 (Iterative
Dichotomiser 3 ) [11]. Subsequently, Quinlan has developed an extension to this
algorithm called C4.5 [12], which incorporates several extensions such as the
possibility to handle continuous attributes or missing attribute values. However,
both C4.5 and ID3 rely on the notion of information gain, which is directly based
on the Shannon entropy [13], as a splitting criterion.
Inference attacks. An inference attack is a data mining process by which an
adversary that has access to some public information or the output of some
computation depending on the personal information of individuals (plus pos-
sibly some auxiliary information) can deduce private information about these
individuals that was not explicitly present in the data and that was normally
supposed to be protected. In the context of PPDM, a classification attack [8] and
regression attack [9] working on decision trees were proposed by Li and Sarkar.
The main objective of these two attacks is to reconstruct the attribute class of
some of the individuals that were present in the dataset on which the decision
tree has been trained. This can be seen as a special case of the reconstruction at-
tack that we propose in this work that aims at reconstructing not only the class
attribute of a data point but also the other attributes. It was also shown by Kifer
that the knowledge of the data distribution (which is sometimes public) can help
the adversary to cause a privacy breach. More precisely, Kifer has introduced
the deFinetti attack [5] that aims at building a classifier predicting the sensitive
attribute corresponding to a set of non-sensitive attributes. Finally, we refer the
reader to [7] for a study evaluating the usefulness of some privacy-preserving
techniques for preventing inference attacks.
3 Reconstruction Attack
3.1 Reconstruction Problem
In our setting, the adversary can observe a classifier C that has been computed
by running a learning algorithm on the original dataset Dorig. The main ob-
jective of the adversary is to conduct a reconstruction attack that reconstruct
a probabilistic version of this dataset, called Drec, from the description of the
classifier C (and possibly some auxiliary information Aux) that is as close as
possible from the original dataset Dorig according to a distance metric Dist that
we defined later.
Definition 1 (Probabilistic dataset). A probabilistic dataset D is composed
of n data points {x1, . . . , xn} such that each datapoint x corresponds to a set of
d attributes A = {A1, A2, A3, . . . , Ad}. Each attribute Ak has a domain of defi-
nition Vk that includes all the possible values of this attribute if this attribute is
categorical or corresponds to an interval [min,max] if the attribute is numerical.
The knowledge about a particular attribute is modeled by a probability distribution
over all the possible values of this attribute. If a particular value of the attribute
gathers all the probability mass ( i.e., its value is perfectly determined), then the
attribute is said to be deterministic. By extension, a probabilistic dataset whose
attributes are all deterministic ( i.e., the knowledge about the dataset is perfect)
is called a deterministic dataset.
In this work, we assume that the original dataset Dorig is deterministic in the
sense that it contains no uncertainty about the value of a particular attribute
and no missing values. From this dataset Dorig, a classifier C is learnt and the
adversary will reconstruct a probabilistic dataset Drec. For the sake of simplicity
in this paper, we also assume that the adversary has no prior knowledge about
some attributes being more likely than others. Therefore, if for a particular
attribute Ak of a datapoint x, the adversary hesitates between two different
possibles values then both values are equally probable for him (i.e., uniform
prior). In the same manner, if the adversary knows that the value of a particular
attribute belongs to a restricted interval [a, b] then no value within this interval
seems more probable to him than other. Finally, in the situation in which the
adversary has absolutely no information about the value of a particular attribute,
we use the symbol “∗” to denote this absence of knowledge (i.e., Ak = ∗ if the
adversary has no knowledge about the value of the kth, attribute or even x = ∗
if the adversary has no information at all about a particular data point).
3.2 Evaluating the Quality of the Reconstruction
In order to evaluate the quality of the reconstruction, we define a distance be-
tween two datasets that quantifies how close these two datasets are. We assume
that the two datasets are of same size and that before the computation of this
distance they have been aligned in the sense that each data point of one dataset
has been paired with one (and only one) data point of the other dataset.
Definition 2 (Distance between probabilistic datasets). Let D and D′ be
two probabilistic datasets each containing n data points ( i.e., respectively D =
{x1, . . . , xn} and D′ = {x′1, . . . , x′n}) such that each datapoint x corresponds to
a set of d attributes A = {A1, A2, A3, . . . , Ad}. The distance between these two















i) ∪ Vk(xi) corresponds to the union of the values for the kth
attribute of xi and x
′
i, Vk is all the possible values of this k
th attribute (or all the
discretized values in case of an interval) and H denotes the Shannon entropy.
Basically, this distance quantifies for each data point and each attribute, the
uncertainty that remains about the particular value of an attribute if the two
knowledges are pooled together. In particular, this distance is normalized and
will be equal to zero if and only if it is computed between two copies of the
same deterministic dataset (e.g., Dist(Dorig,Dorig)= 0). On the other extreme,
let D∗ be a probabilistic dataset in which the adversary is totally ignorant of
all the attributes of all the data points (i.e., ∀k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ d, ∀i such
that 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Vk(xi) = ∗). In this situation, Dist(D∗,D∗)= 1 as the distance












. For a reconstructed
dataset Drec, the computation of the distance between this dataset and itself
returns a value between 0 and 1 that quantifies the level of uncertainty (or
conversely the amount of information) in this dataset.
While Definition 2 is generic enough to quantify the distance between two
probabilistic datasets, in our context we will mainly use it to compute the dis-
tance between the probabilistic dataset Drec and the deterministic dataset Dorig.
More precisely, we will use the value of Dist(Drec,Dorig) as the measure of success
of a reconstruction attack.
3.3 Continuous Release of Information
In this work, we are also interested in the situation in which a classifier is re-
leased on a regular basis (i.e., not just once), after the additions of new data
points to the dataset. We now define the notion of compatibility between two
probabilistic datasets, which is in a sense also a measure of distance between
these two datasets.
Definition 3 (Compatibility between probabilistic datasets). Let D and
D′ be two probabilistic datasets each containing n data points ( i.e., respectively
D = {x1, . . . , xn} and D′ = {x′1, . . . , x′n}) such that each datapoint x corresponds
to a set of d attributes A = {A1, A2, A3, . . . , Ad}. The compatibility between















i)∩Vk(xi) corresponds to the intersection of the values for the kth
attribute of xi and x
′
i, Vk is all the possible values of this k
th attribute (or all the
discretized values in case of an interval) and H denotes the Shannon entropy.
Note that the formula of the compatibility between two datasets is the same
as for the distance with the exception of using the intersection rather than the
union when pooling together two different knowledges about the possible values
of the kth attribute of a data point x. The main objective of the compatibility is
to measure how much the uncertainty is reduced by combining the two different
datasets into one. Suppose for instance, that D and D′ are respectively the
reconstruction obtained by performing a reconstruction attack on two different
classifiers C and C′. .
Merging reconstructed data sets. Let us consider that a first classifier C has been
generated at some point in the past. Later, in the future, new records have been
added to the dataset and another classifier C′ is learnt on this updated version
of the dataset. We assume that an adversary can observe the two classifiers C
and C′ and apply a reconstruction attack on C and C′ to build respectively two
probabilistic datasets D and D′. In order to merge these two datasets D and D′
To merge the two probabilistic datasets D and D′ into one single probabilistic
dataset, denoted Drec, the adversary can adopt the following strategy.
1. Apply the reconstruction attack on the classifiers C and C′ to obtain re-
spectively the reconstructed datasets D and D′ (we assume without loss of
generality that the size of D′ is smaller or equal to the size of D).
2. Pad D′ with extra data points that have perfect uncertainty (i.e., x = ∗)
until the size of D′ is the same as the size of D.
3. Apply the Hungarian algorithm [6, 10] in order to align D and D′. Defining
an alignment amounts to sort one of the datasets such that the ith record xi
of D corresponds to the ith record x′i of D′. The Hungarian method solves
the alignment problem and finds the optimal solution that maximizes the
compatibility Comp(D , D′) between two sets of n data points.
4. Merge D and D′ into a single reconstructed dataset Drec by using the
alignment computed in the previous step. For each attribute Ak, the domain
of definition the merged point is made of the intersection of Vk(x) ∩ Vk(x′)
if this intersection is non-empty and set to the default value ∗ otherwise.
5. Compute the distance metric Dist(Drec,Dorig) for evaluating the success of
the reconstruction attack.
4 Reconstruction Attack on Decision Tree
Let C be a classifier that has been computed by running a C4.5 algorithm on
the original dataset Dorig. This decision tree classifier is the input of our recon-
struction algorithm. For each branch of the tree, the sequence of tests composing
this branch form the description of probabilistic data points that will be recon-
structed out of this branch. The reconstruction algorithms follows a branch either
in a top-down manner and refines progressively the domain of definition Vk(x)
for each attribute Ak of a probabilistic data point x until the leaf is reached.
As we have run a version of C4.5 in which each leaf also contains the number
of data points for each class, we can add the corresponding number of proba-
bilistic data points of each class with the refined description to the probabilistic
dataset D under construction. The algorithm explores all the branches of tree
to reconstruct the whole probabilistic dataset D.
To evaluate the success of this reconstruction attack on a decision tree clas-
sifier, we have run an experiment on the “Adult” dataset from UCI Machine
Learning Repository [2]. This dataset is composed of d = 14 attributes such as
age or marital status, including the income attribute, which is either “> 50K”
or “<= 50” and that we have used as class attribute during the construction
of the decision tree. To construct the C4.5 classifiers, we have used the WEKA
software [15]. Moreover, for each attribute Ak, we have computed its domain of
definition Vk, which is defined by the finite set of possible values. For continu-
ous attribute such as age, the extremal values observed the complete database
were used to determine the minimal and maximal possible values. The exper-
imentations were performed in a random subset of 200 records of the original
“Adult” dataset and not on the complete database. We denote this subset of
200 records by Dorig and the reconstruction attack aims at reconstructing this
particular dataset. The metric Dist is used to evaluate the success of the recon-
struction attack. The smaller this distance, the more accurate the reconstruction
is. Figure 1 displays the result of our experiments obtained when computing the
distance between a reconstructed learnt on a dataset whose number of points
varies between 1 to 200. Not surprisingly, we can see from these results that a
reconstruction attack performed on a classifier that contains more information
about the original dataset leads to a reconstruction that is more accurate (i.e.,
















Fig. 1. Distance between a reconstructed dataset D′ and Dorig when the reconstruction
attack is run on a decision tree learnt on a number of data points varying between 1
and 200 (the size of Dorig).
We have also conducted several experiments in which two reconstructed
datasets learnt from classifiers released at different time where merged using
the algorithm described in Section 3.3. Our main finding is that it is possible
to obtain a limited gain in the order of 0.01 or 0.02 when combining the two
datasets (we leave the details of these experiments for the full version of the
paper due to lack of space).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced the concept of reconstruction attack whose aim
is to reconstruct a probabilistic version of the original dataset from the descrip-
tion of a classifier. We have also proposed a novel distance based on information
entropy that measures the closeness between the original and the reconstructed
datasets and can be used to assess the success of the attack. Moreover, we have
design a specific instance of a reconstruction attack and demonstrate his effi-
ciency on a real dataset coming from the UCI repository. The current work is
only the first step towards the development of a framework for evaluating the
impact of releasing a classifier for the privacy of the dataset. As future works,
we want to design reconstruction attack for other types of classifiers such as
neural networks or ensemble methods such as boosting. We also want to develop
a method for merging several reconstructed datasets into a single coherent one
in case of multiple releases.
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